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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PETER M. LOWE, 
Special Administrator of 
Estate ofT. 0. Nelson, 
Plaintiff and Appella;nt, 
-vs.-
MAX ROSENLOF and 
MAX ROSENLOF 
CONSTRUCTION CO., 
a partnership, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9348 
BRIEF O·F RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This suit was brought by the appellant to recover 
damages for an alleged breach of a written subcontract 
and for the conversion of some prefabricated forms used 
in pouring concrete. The respondents had the prime con-
tract to build a high school building in Lehi, Utah. They 
subcontracted the basic concrete work to appellant. The 
appellant alleges that the respondents "without legal ex-
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cuse excluded" appellant from the work and converted 
the tools, materials and concrete forms which appellant 
had on the job. (R. 4) Respondents counterclaimed, 
contending that the appellant had breached the contract 
by abandoning the work. (R. 6) TJ:le trial court found 
that the appellant had abandoned the work and awarded 
damages to the respondents. It also found that respond-
ents had converted part of the concrete forms. Plaintiff 
has appealed. 
We do not agree with the statement of facts made 
by the appellant. It ignores the decision of the trial 
court which resolved the conflicts in the evidence in favor 
of respondents. Since, however, two of the three points 
raised go to the sufficiency of the evidence, we believe that 
we can best detail the evidence as a part of our Argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
THE APPELLANT BREACHED THE CON-
TRACT BY ABANDONING THE WORK AND 
REQUIRING RESPONDENTS TO COM-
PLETE IT. 
PorNT II 
SINCE APPELLANT BREACHED THE CON-
TRACT BY ~\BANDONING THE \VORK, HE 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO CONTINUE TO EN-
FORCE THE BENEFITS OF THE CONTRACT. 
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PoiNT III 
TIIE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THE FORl\IS CONVERTED HAD A MARI\:ET 
VALUE OF $4,000.00 IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
(Tr. refers to the transcript of the evidence, and (R) 
to the reconl of the pleadings and motions.) 
The trial court has found that the appellant aban-
doned the work and required the respondents to complete 
it. The primary issue to be determined is whether or not 
the trial court's finding in this regard is supported by 
substantial evidence. If this finding is sustained by the 
evidence, then, although the plaintiff might be permitted 
to recover for the value of the work performed by him 
on a theory of quantum meruit, he can not recover on the 
contract. His own material breach of the contract is a bar 
to an action to enforce it. Because of the importance of 
this issue, we first address ourselves to it, although it is 
Point III in the appellant's brief. 
PoiNT I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
THE APPELLANT BREACHED THE CON-
TRACT BY ABANDONING THE WORK AND 
REQUIRING RESPONDENTS TO COM-
PLETE IT. 
The court expressly found in Finding No. 5 that the 
plaintiff was in serious financial distress on August 1, 
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1958; that his labor and materialmen were unpaid, and 
that ''on or about September 9, 1958, the plaintiff aban-
doned the work and the contract and defendant was re-
quired at said time to take over and complete plaintiff's 
work." (R. 106) 
This court has stated on numerous occasions that a 
:finding of fact made by the trial court will not be disturbed 
if it is based on substantial evidence. See Child v. Child, 
8 u t. 2d 361, 332 p. 2d 981. 
There is ample evidence here to support the court's 
finding. At the outset we direct this court's attention 
to the testimony of Max Rosenlof. He testified that he 
made a long distance telephone call to the appellant's 
home on September 9, 1958. (Tr. 136) The appellant 
admits that the call was made. (Tr. 83) Both admit that 
the initial inquiry made by Mr. Rosenlof concerned ap-
pellant's absence from the job, and that appellant ad-
vised that he was trying to sell his home. ( Tr. 83, 136) 
At this point the parties disagree as to what was said. 
Mr. Rosenlof testified (as the trial court found) that 
appellant said he could not go on, and that respondents 
would have to take over. 
''When I got him on the telephone I said, 'Ted, 
there's got to be something done on that job. I 
haven't seen you on that job for approximately 
two weeks. The men are running wild and getting 
in trouble because they ha-ve not been getting their 
pay checks' * * * 
"I asked him about getting down on the job 
because the job was running \vild and he said, 
4 
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'Max, you are just going to have to take the job 
over; I am broke; I have got a lot of people pres-
suring· me for money and I can no longer finance 
the job and I am about going crazy. I am going 
to lose my house ; I am going to lose my trucks, 
the forms and the equipment.' He says, 'I have 
been home trying to sell my house so that I can get 
some operating capital to keep on operating with.'' 
(Tr. 136-7) 
The appellant denies this. (Tr. 84) But the trial 
court did not believe him and an examination of the tes-
timony demonstrates why. It is admitted that the phone 
call was made about September 9th. (Tr. 83) and that on 
the morning of the lOth, Rosenlof did take over the job. 
(Tr. 33) If, as the appellant testified (Tr. 83, 33), Rosen-
lof was satisfied with the answer that appellant would 
be back down on the job in a day or two, and the conver-
sation had ended with that understanding, it is not 
likely that he would take over the work the following 
morning. There is not any dispute in the evidence at all 
concerning the fact that Rosenlof did take over the fol-
lowing morning. (Tr. 33, 102) This is exactly what would 
have been expected if the substance of the phone conver-
sation was as Rosenlof testified; but it is completely in-
consistent with what would have been expected if the 
phone call had ended as appellant testified. 
Appellant's own conduct after he learned that Rosen-
lof had taken over the job likewise is completely incon-
sistent with his testimony at the trial. If the telephone 
conversation had ended with appellant's assurance that 
he would return to the work in a day or two, and with 
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Rosenlof apparently satisfied, Nelson would have been 
very much surprised by the respondent's action in tak-
ing over the work the following morning. It is completely 
illogical and contrary to ordinarily expected conduct 
under these circumstances that appellant would not have 
contacted Rosenlof to find out why. Appellant did not 
seek to find out why; his only reaction was to have his 
wife go to Rosenlof to try to get some money to cover 
appellant's payroll checks which were "bouncing." (Tr. 
106-7) This conduct on the part of appellant demonstrates 
that he must have known when the parties concluded 
their telephone conversation on September 9th that the 
work was going to be taken over. Thus, when he was 
told by his foreman (Tr. 87) that Rosenlof had taken 
over, he did not need to call Rosenlof- he already had 
discussed this on September 9th, and knew why. 
The direct testimony of Rosenlof to the effect that 
Nelson told him he (Nelson) would have to quit and that 
Rosenlof would have to complete the work is further cor-
roborated by various other convincing bits of evidence. 
First, Rosenlof testified that appellant had stated 
as his reason for quitting that he was in severe financial 
distress. This is entirely consistent ·with what the actual 
facts were, for appellant was in financial distress. A 
bill for work performed by Rex Industries way back in 
.Niarch was still unpaid. (Tr. 6"7 -8) The suppliers who had 
furnished the lumber for the doing of the work had not 
been fully paid. (Tr. 70-71) Arnold Machinery, from 
whom he had rented a vibrator in April, had only been 
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paid one $90.00 payment. (Tr. 71) Conesco, from "\Yhom 
he was renting part of the forms, had written a demand 
letter on August 28th, telling of a bill for $2429.32, which 
wns overdue. (Ex. 16, 2, 68) Some of the payroll checks 
issued to cover the work period from August 1st to An-
gust 15th had not cleared when presented, and some of 
the men had not been paid since the 1st of August. (Tr. 
94) Thus, what was happening on the job is exactly what 
Rosenlof said he told Nelson and what Nelson told him. 
Rosenlof said the men were ''running wild'' because they 
hadn't been paid, and that Nelson had to do something 
about the job. (Tr. 136-7) Nelson responded that he 
was broke, and that Rosenlof would have to take over. 
(Tr. 136-7) Thus, while we have only Rosenlof's testi-
mony as to what was said, it is not likely that Rosenlof 
called long distance merely to pass the time of day. It 
is more likely that the trouble which was occurring on 
the job was the subject matter of that telephone conver-
sation (as Rosenlof testified); that he did tell Nelson of 
the trouble; that Nelson, because he was in financial dis-
tress, did say that respondents would have to take over, 
and that respondents therefore did so. 
Second, an independent witness, to-wit, l{elsey Chat-
field, inspector for the architect, testified that on 
four or five occasions within a month to six weeks be-
fore Nelson left the job, appellant told Chatfield that 
appellant was in financial difficulty; that he couldn't fi-
nance the work, and he used the expression, ''he would 
have to quit." (Tr. 119) This bit of evidence is impor-
tant in two respects. First, if Chatfield was telling the 
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truth, Nelson was not, because Nelson testified under 
oath that he had no such conversation with Chatfield. 
(Tr. 88) If Nelson would not tell the court the truth, 
about this, how could he be believed on other matters~ 
Secondly, if Chatfield was the one telling the truth, then 
for a month to six weeks before September 9th Nelson 
was advising the inspector that he was going to have to 
quit the job because he couldn't finance it. 
Third, in another material respect the court would 
be justified in refusing to believe the appellant as to the 
substance of the conversation on September 9th. Ap-
pellant stated on direct examination (Tr. 34) and on 
cross-examination (Tr. 84, 87 and 99) that "absolutely," 
they did not discuss taking over the work on September 
9th. Yet on his deposition, he stated exactly the opposite. 
On his deposition, he was asked for the substance of the 
telephone conversation, and he answered, ''and he (Ros-
enlof) said he was taken over." (Tr. 85) He was pressed 
on the deposition for more details about this conversa-
tion, and he answered, ''I just don't remember what the 
discussion was, only that he was taking the job over." 
''Q. Did he tell you whyt A. No, he just said he 
was taking the job over that ·was all." (Tr. 86) 
Thus, we have the appellant at the trial testifying 
under oath that the subject of Rosenlof taking the job 
over was not discussed ( Tr. 87, 99) and yet on his depo-
sition he testified that it was. (Tr. 86) He certainly was 
either not telling the truth at the time of the trial or 
else was not telling the truth at the time of the deposition. 
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This (like his testimony about his talks with Chatfield) 
indicated that he was not being wholly truthful 'vith the 
court. 
Thus to sustain the trial court's finding that appel~ 
lant abandoned the work and required respondents to 
complete it, we first have Rosenlof's direct testimony that 
he told Nelson the unpaid men were running wild, and 
Nelson would have to do something, and Nelson said he 
was having financial trouble and was going to quit and 
that respondents would have to take over. Respondents, 
consistent with this, did take over the next morning. 
Nelson did nothing - didn't even contact respond-
ents about it. He was in financial distress, his men were 
unpaid, his materialmen were unpaid, and he for a month 
had been telling Chatfield he was going to quit. The only 
conflicting testimony we have is the testimony of Nelson 
to the effect that a taking over of the work was not dis-
cussed and Rosenlof was satisfied when Nelson said he 
would return to the job in a couple of days. But Nelson 
had not told the same story on his deposition; he had 
denied talking with Chatfield about quitting, yet evi-
denced no surprise when Rosenlof did take over. The 
court believed Rosenlof and the finding is fully supported 
by the evidence. 
Finally, the appellant argues under Point III that 
the financial difficulties plaguing the appellant were 
caused by the failure of the respondent to make payments 
in accordance with the terms of the contract. This just 
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simply is not supported by the evidence and is contrary 
to the trial court's findings. The respondents went far 
beyond their contract obligations in an effort to help the 
appellant get the job done. Specifically, we note the 
following: 
(a) Respondents cosigned with appellant for a loan 
from Geneva Rock Products Co. for $1,000.00 to raise 
the money to help appellant get started on the job. They 
certainly had no contract obligation to do so, but every-
one admits that they did. (Tr. 149, 52) 
(b) .Appellant admitted that he understood that he 
was to paid only once each month for the work he had 
done, (Tr. 60) and the subcontract itself clearly so pro-
vides. (R. 10) However, through .August 9th, respond-
ents paid appellant twice a month. (Tr. 61-62) In this 
regard, it is without dispute that by .August 9th respond-
ents had paid appellant $34,540.00, and also had made 
a $500.00 payment to Geneva Rock Products on the loan. 
(Tr. 21) The times when these payments were made 
are set out in full at R. 53 in the findings. 
(c) Since appellant brought this suit for breach of 
contract he had the burden of proving that he had not 
been paid in accordance with estimates submitted . .A de-
mand was made at the trial for him to produce the esti-
mates, (Tr. 65) and he produced four. (Ex. 8 and 12) (Tr. 
154). These totaled only $29,500.00, and cover bills for 
work done from .April to .August 1st. (Tr. 156) .Appel-
lant did not know amount billed for 1\Iarch, if any (Tr. 
63). The court expressly found "that no estimate was 
10 
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submitted h:· the plaintiff to the defendant for work done 
during the month of August.'' (Finding 5, Tr. 106) Al-
though Nelson said he had one, he could not produce it. 
(Tr. 156) Nor did he give the amount. 
There thus is no evidence whatever to sustain any 
contention that the amounts paid did not exceed the esti-
mates submitted. The total estimates shown by the evi-
dence are the four contained in Exhibits 8 and 12. These 
total $29,500.00 for work done through August 1st, (for 
April, May, June and July) and the stipulated payments 
show that respondents had paid the appellant $34,540.00 
for the same period of time ( Tr. 21) and in addition had 
paid $500.00 on the loan from Geneva Rock Products 
Company. 
(d) Under Point III of appellant's brief, he sets forth 
a computation of the percentages of the total contract 
price which had been received by respondents at the end 
of each month. He argues that by September lOth appel-
lant was, under these figures, entitled to at least $43,670.00. 
It is difficult for us to understand the logic of this argu-
ment. In the first place, the percentages appellant is using 
are through the end of September, and appellant aban-
doned the job September 9th. He was paid on August 
9th on the last estimate he had submitted. Even if 
arguendo we admit appellant's figures as shown on page 
11 of his brief, he would by the end of July only have 
been entitled to $34,170.00, less the 10 per cent reten-
tion as permitted by the subcontract. (R. 10) He had 
received $34,540.00 directly and $500.00 had been paid to 
11 
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Geneva Rock. This was nearly $1000 more than the 
amount contended for without any retention. 
Of course, if the work had been going along properly 
and plaintiff had not abandoned the job, he would have 
been entitled to submit an estimate on September 1st 
for his work done in August and to have been paid 90 
per cent thereof by September lOth. Under the figures 
contended for by appellant through August, appellant 
would have been entitled to receive $39,270.00 (less the 10 
per cent retention) if he had submitted his August esti-
mate. Appellant had been paid within $300 of this amount 
for work done to the end of July, to-wit: 
Paid Direct ------------------------------------ $34,540.00 
Paid to Geneva Rock Prod.__________ 500.00 
10 per cent retention on $39,270 3,927.00 
Total ---------------------------------------- $38,967.00 
Therefore, even if appellant had submitted an esti-
mate for work done in August, and had done so on the 
basis of the theory urged by appellant on page 11 of 
his brief, appellant had been overpaid to such an ex-
tent by August 9th that he would have had only $300 
coming when the estimate became due on September lOth. 
(e) On page 65 of the Transcript and in Interroga-
tory No. 8 (R. 77) appellant admits that the total out-
of-pocket cost of his work through September 9th, ·was 
about $36,000.00. This included the unpaid bills (Tr. 65) 
Since by the 9th of August he had received $34,540.00 
and $500.00 had been paid on account to Geneva Rock 
12 
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Products, the payments by August 9th came within 
$1,000.00 of his total out-of-pocket costs, including his 
unpaid bills, plus all costs incurred in August and through 
September 9th. This fact alone conclusively demonstrates 
that it was not the amount paid by respondent which 
caused him to leave his bills unpaid, for debts incurred in 
March and April were still unpaid. (Tr. 67 and 71) 
(f) The contract price of $51,000.00 for placing 5,400 
cubic yards of concrete computes out at $9.45 per cubic 
yard. It is admitted by appellant, however, that he based 
his estimates and billings on a $10.00 per cubic yard 
price, and was paid on that basis. (See for example Ex. 
8 and Tr. 983.) This further liberalized the payments to 
him. 
(g) Finally, as will he argued in answer to Point I, 
during the same period of time defendant had furnished a 
crane to place the concrete and had done plaintiff's work 
in two areas at a total cost, as found by the court, of 
nearly $7,500.00. This was not deducted from the pay-
ments made because Nelson said he needed the money 
(Tr. 146) 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that his finan-
cial distress was not caused by any default or failure to 
cooperate on the part of the respondent. 
PoiNT II 
SINCE APPELLANT BREACHED THE CON-
TRACT BY ABANDONING THE WORK, HE 
13 
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IS NOT ENTITLED TO CONTINUE TO EN-
FORCE THE BENEFITS OF THE CONTRACT. 
The title used by appellant in his Point I indicates 
that appellant erroneously believes that he is still entitled 
to enforce the contract and have the benefit of all of its 
terms, even though he breached it and abandoned the 
work. When plaintiff abandoned the contract, less than 
75 per cent of the work had been completed. (R. 165) His 
failure to complete the work was, of course, a material 
breach of contract. Having breached the contract, it is 
fundamental law that he can not continue to enforce it, 
or to have its benefits. His right to recover for work 
completed prior to September 9th can not be based on the 
contract, but can be allowed, if at all, only on a quantum 
meruit basis to prevent an unjust enrichment. 
If plaintiff could continue to recover the full contract 
price less only the naked cost of completing the work, it 
would permit him to turn his own wrong (the breach of 
contract) into a triumph. If this were the law, it probably 
would be advantageous to a contractor to a bandon the 
work. Usually a prime contractor can complete the work 
as efficiently and for about the same cost as the subcon-
tractor could have done it. If the subcontractor could 
abandon the work and still recover on the contract he 
would be permitted to have the benefits of the contract 
without having had any of its burdens. Because this re-
sult is unreasonable, the cases IlC'Yer permit such a re-
covery. The general law clearly is that full, or at least 
substantial, performance of the \York is a condition prec-
edent to payment. Since the denial of any recovery often 
14 
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would unjustly enrich the owner (in this case the prime 
contractor), the courts permit the contractor to recover on 
a quantum meruit basis, but only for the reasonable value 
of the work he has performed less the owner's damage. 
We will not labor the point. The cases dealing with this 
are noted by the West Digest System under Key No. 
319 (1) and I{ey No. 297, where numerous cases are noted. 
The general rule is discussed in 12 Am. J ur. 903 
as follows: 
'' ... partial performance of an entire and in-
divisible contract by one of the parties does not 
entitle him to performance of the contract by the 
other and does not wa,rrant a, recovery by the for-
mer against the laUer upon the contract. Full or 
substantial performance of the promise of one 
party is a condition precedent to the right to main-
tain an action on the promise of the other. . . . '' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The rule is also recognized in 17 C. J. S. Section 
511 as follows : 
"Ordinarily, there can be no recovery on an 
entire contract for part performance although 
there may be a recovery pro tanto or on the quan-
tum meruit for accepted benefits or in case full 
performance was prevented by the other party. 
Different rules apply to severable contracts.'' 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized and applied 
this rule in Ryan. v. Curlew Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 36 
Utah 382, 104 P. 218. This case involved the construction 
of a dam. The plaintiff brought suit on the contract to 
recover a sum which he claimed was still due to him. He 
15 
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alleged that he had complied with the provisions of the 
contract for the building of the dam but the defendant 
contended that he had not completed his work. This issue 
was submitted to a jury and the jury found in favor of 
the defendant. The Supreme Court said: 
''In an action upon the contract, appellant can-
not recover unless and until he shows that he has, 
substantially at least, complied with its provisions. 
Appellant alleged that he had so complied andre-
spondent denied these allegations and much 
evidence was directed to the issue thus pre-
sented .... " 
The jury had found the issues in favor of the defendant 
and thus had found that the contractor had not completed 
the dam as required by the contract. The court then 
noted: 
''The jury allowed him (the contractor) the 
contract price for all material furnished and all 
work done by him. In view that the jury have 
found that the dam was not completed in accord-
ance with the terms of the contract, and the find-
ing being supported by the evidence, we think the 
appellant was allowed all that he was entitled to." 
See also Miller v. You,ng (Okla.) 172 P. 2d 994; Ken-
nard v. Keller, (Cal.) 269 P. 114; Miller v. Yockey, (Colo.) 
112 P. 772; Hanley v. Walker, (Mich.), 45 N.W. 573. 
In Miller v. Young, supra,. the plaintiff took over work 
which had already been commenced, and agreed to com-
plete it. He later quit without legal excuse. The owner 
wouldn't pay him anything, and he brought suit. The 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lower court granted judgment, but the appellate court re-
versed, stating: 
"It is an elementary principle of law of con-
tracts that in order to recover upon a contract, the 
contractor . . . must first establish his own per-
formance or a valid excuse for his failure to per-
form (citing authorities including Am. Juris). 
Since plaintiff failed under the uncontradicted 
proof to complete the work he contracted to do, 
without valid excuse for such failure, he was en-
titled to no judgment against defendant.'' 
There are authorities recognizing that he should be 
paid on a quantum meruit basis. 
See for example, Eckes v. Luce, (Okla) 173 P. 219. 
The holding is reflected by the following headnote : 
''A building contractor who entered into a con-
tract with the owner to furnish material and labor 
and to remove the old and build a new front in a 
storeroom according to plans and specifications 
and was to receive therefor the sum of $725, and 
after certain materials had been furnished and 
part of the labor performed on the contract the 
contractor abandoned the work, the owner ac-
cepted the work done and materials furnished, 
completed the work at his own expense. Held, the 
contractor is entitled to recover for the work done 
and materials furnished according to the contract 
price, in proportion that the same bears to the 
completed work, less the damages sustained by 
the owner by reason of the contractor's failure to 
complete the work.'' 
See also Ball v. Dolatn, 21 S. D. 619, 114 N.W. 98. 
Under these authorities the very most the plain-
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tiff was entitled to was credit for the reasonable value 
of the work he did, less respondents' damages. He was 
not entitled to be paid an.ything for the work he did not 
do. The trial court went far beyond this here and its 
decision is much more favorable to the appellant than he 
was entitled to under the foregoing authorities. 
The court had found, as discussed above in Point I, 
that the plaintiff had breached the contract by abandon-
ing the work and had required the respondents to com-
plete it. The court had no direct evidence as to the rea-
sonable value of the work actually done by the appellant. 
Only 4,367 yards of concrete had been formed and placed 
at the time the appellant abandoned the work (R. 105) 
and of this the respondents had formed and poured the 
columns and beams in the gym and administration areas, 
and had furnished a crane to place substantial parts of 
the concrete. We will detail the evidence on this below. 
It also was admitted that on the entire job covered by 
the contract, a total of 5,982 yards of concrete was placed. 
(R. 106) Even though respondents had formed and 
poured the last 1,615 yards and had done the columns and 
beams, the court awarded the plaintiff credit for the full 
contract price of $9.45 per cubic yard, on the entire 5,982 
cubic yards of concrete, whereas it should have limited 
him to the value of the work done by him. The court then 
totaled the respondents' total cost for the concrete work 
covered by the entire contract. These costs consisted of 
the $35,540.00 paid directly to the plaintiff and Geneva 
Rock Products, the $5,903.81 which the respondents would 
yet have to pay to unpaid materialmen and laborers, the 
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costs respondents had incurred in completing the form-
ing and placing 1,615 yards which were left to be poured 
when plaintiff abandoned the work ($12,527.14); the crane 
rental for placing concrete while plaintiff was on the 
job and the cost to the respondents of forming and pour-
ing the columns and beams in the gym deck and the ad-
ministration area ($7,569.00). It found that defendants' 
total costs thus exceeded the contract price respondents 
would have paid if plaintiff had performed his contract 
by the amount of $5,010.65, and awarded defendants 
judgment therefor. See Findings 6-9 (R. 106-7) The 
court recognized expressly in Finding 10: 
"That if the plaintiff is charged with said 
$5,010.65 (respondents' excess costs), plaintiff 
will be given credit for all the concrete poured at 
the contract price of $9.45 per yard, and this re-
sults in a, substarn.tial credit to the plaintiff, which 
plaintiff would not have received if plaintiff had 
only been given credit for the 4,367 yards, ':l' * * 
completed before the work was abandoned, but 
the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to any 
benefit which accrued by reason of defendant 
being able to complete the remaining work for a 
lesser cost per yard than the contract price.'' 
The court went on to find that it was awarding this credit 
because the work remaining to be done would be less 
expensive per yard. 
Thus, the Utah Supreme Court and the general au-
thorities hold that when a contractor fails to complete his 
\York, he is entitled to a credit against the owners' dam-
age for the value of the work done by him, but no more. 
Here the trial court has given him credit, not only for 
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credit relates to the columns and beams in the pan area, 
after having first denied it. (Tr. 82-83) When he was 
asked about this on his deposition, he said he couldn't 
remember anything about why he gave this credit. (Tr. 
51) At the trial he "remembered" that Rosenlof forced 
him to bill it this way. (Tr. 82) It is thus admitted that 
Rosenlof did do the work, and before the work was aban-
doned Nelson even gave credit for it in his invoice. (Ex. 8) 
Both parties also admit that Rosenlof - not Nelson 
--did the beams in the Administrative area. (Tr. 81, 
128) 
The court let appellant have the contract price on 
the full 5,982 yards of concrete work done on the whole 
job, and charged him only with the defendants' excess 
cost above the agreed contract price. While we believe 
that this is more favorable than the law allows, we did 
not cross-appeal because it perhaps reaches substantially 
the same end result as would a proper quantum meruit 
approach. 
PoiNT III 
THE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THE FORMS CONVERTED HAD A MARKET 
VALUE OF $4,000.00 IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
This court has stated on many occasions that the 
measure of damages for conversion is the market Yalue 
of the item converted at or near the time of the con-
version. Such is the rule as stated by the Utah Supreme 
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Court in the case cited by appellant, to-wit Lym v. Thomp-
son, 112 Utah 24, 184 P. 2d 667, where the court said: 
''As a general rule the measure of the value 
of an item of converted property which has a mar-
ket is value at the time and place of conversion." 
In that case the court did ''uphold'' a trial court finding 
which based the value on cost new upon a showing that 
most of the pipe was new or ''the equivalent of new.'' 
Here appellant seeks to" reverse" because the trial court 
would not accept "cost" as "value." There the court 
commented that although some of the pipe was "equiva-
lent of new," it was not new pipe, but the price would 
be difficult to determine, because "plaintiff's pipe is not 
possible of identification, an appraisal is impossible." 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held in K n.ighton. 
v. Manning, 84 Utah 1, 33 P. 2d 401 (1933) that the failure 
to prove the value of property alleged to have been con-
verted, completely precludes recovery on the theory of 
conversion. 
In Haycraft v. Adams, 82 Utah 347, 24 P. 2d 1110 
(1933), the Supreme Court elaborated on the sufficiency 
of the proof of value. That case involved an auctioneer 
who had sold certain personal property at the request of 
a wife, without the permission of her husband. In an 
action by the husband for conversion of the property, the 
jury awarded the husband $750.00 as the market value 
of the property at the time it was converted. The de-
fendant appealed, relying principally on the ground 
that the evidence introduced as to value 'iYas in-
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sufficient to support the verdict. In that regard the 
plaintiff's evidence (as did plaintiff's here) consisted 
only of the cost of the items when purchased, plus evi-
dence as to what their cost new would have been if they 
had been purchased at the time of the trial. He had also 
called a witness who stated that the property ''doesn't 
depreciate very much." The court noted (as here) that 
the property converted was still in the possession of the 
defendant and could have been examined, and that it was 
the duty of the plaintiff to produce evidence as to the 
market value. The court then said: 
"Plaintiff apparently took the position that 
cost price was sufficient. The plaintiff made no 
attempt to supply any information as to the con-
dition of the furniture or any other facts which 
might establish value, except the cost prices.'' 
It then reversed the lower court, because under these 
facts it had erred in placing its verdict on cost. 
Here Max Rosenlof testified that in his opinion the 
forms at the completion of the job should not be ap-
praised at more than $4,000.00 (Tr. 138) He was speak-
ing about" all" of the forms, and the court accepted this 
uncontradicted testimony. \V e emphasize the word'' all,'' 
because as is noted below, only a part of the forms were 
converted. As in the Haycraft case, supra, the trial court 
also had before it appellant's testimony concerning the 
original cost of the forms. He introduced the original 
invoices and a summary thereof, showing a total cost of 
$17,707.49, but the invoices included some hard·ware and 
bolts, as can be seen by comparing the items in the sum-
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mation with the invoices. The $17,707.00 :figure also in-
cludes one invoice dated March 21, 1958, for sixty 2 x 8 
panels at a unit price of $57.90 each. However, the in-
voice also shows that only 34 of these 60 were shipped, 
and the balance were back-ordered. There is no testi-
mony to show that the 26 which were backordered were 
on the job. This $17,707.00 figure also reflects the price 
of ''all'' the forms, whereas the evidence only shows that 
60 per cent thereof were converted. (We will detail this 
evidence below.) It will also be noted that the major por-
tion of the forms shown in Ex. 4 were purchased between 
May of 1955 and April of 1957. 
Also, as in the Haycraft case, Mr. Nelson testified 
that the price of forms new had increased in recent years, 
and that it would now cost $20,071.00 to purchase the 
forms new. (Tr. 24) He admitted that the forms depre-
ciate with use; (Tr. 72) that the amount of depreciation 
will depend on how they are used and what care is taken 
to maintain them; that the use of the forms on the State 
.Jiental Hospital (the conversion) might not have hurt 
them very much if they were properly taken care of. (Tr. 
73) He also indicated that these forms had been used 
"approximately" 300 to 400 times, and that with proper 
care they might have been used a total of 1,000 times, if 
"taken care of." (Tr. 73) He did not, however, give one 
word of testimony as to the condition of the forms or how 
they had been maintained. 
The trial court expressly found that the subcontract 
agreement (R. 10) permitted the respondents to use the 
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forms to complete the work, and that the use of the forms 
to complete the work was not a conversion. (Finding 11, 
R. 109) 
It also found that respondents had acquired owner-
ship of a chattel mortgage on the forms and had fore-
closed the mortgage by private sale; that plaintiff had 
had notice of the sale, but had made no effort to bid for 
the forms or to protect his mortgagor's interest therein. 
(Finding 14 R. 109) This mortgage by its terms ex-
pressly also permitted the holder of the mortgage to 
hold possession of the forms if the mortgage were in de-
fault. (See Ex. 14, Finding 14) It was in default. (Tr. 
28) Therefore, the use of the forms and their possession 
after September 9, 1958, was not a conversion. 
The evidence, however, did show that Rosenlof used 
some of the forms twice in completing some work at the 
State Mental Hospital. He was not asked for any detail. 
His total testimony on this use is at page 144, and is as 
follows: 
'' Q. In respect to the forms that we are talking 
about, the use of the forms, I think in the 
answer to the interrogations you indicated 
you have used these forms on two other jobs, 
is that correct~ 
''A. One other job. 
"Q. What other job was that~ 
''A. The State l\[ental Hospital. 
'' Q. When did you use those forms~ When did 
you go to that job~ 
''A. In March of 1959 we started it.'' 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The interrogatory to which counsel was referring is 
Interrogatory No. 3 (R. 35) and the answer thereto (R. 
38) in which Rosenlof stated that "about 60 per cent 
of the forms were used twice." This is all the evidence 
there is to identify the forms which were converted. 
Rosenlof was also asked by the same interrogatory 
to state where the forms were and he answered: 
"Forms are now located at 1400 North State, 
Provo, Utah.'' 
So the forms were available and could have been 
appraised and their market value ascertained. But 
plaintiff made no effort to do this. Counsel also had Mr. 
Rosenlof on the stand and cross-examined him about his 
answer to the interrogatory on the use of the forms 
ro (Tr. 144) but he did not see fit to ask him which forms 
,n~ were used, whether they were the newest ones or the 
ill. older ones, or which ones, and the trial court was totally 
without evidence from which it could have determined 
which of the forms were converted. The burden in this 
regard was, of course, on the plaintiff. 
The trial court expressly found that only" part" of 
the forms were converted- no other finding could have 
been sustained by the evidence. (Finding 15) It also 
found from the only competent evidence it had on mar-
ket value that" all" of the forms had a value of $4,000.00. 
Still it awarded Nelson the full $4,000.00, although only 
60 per cent of the forms had been converted. (Finding 
15) If the forms used on the State Mental Hospital and 
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thus converted were a fair average as to value, this 
$4,000.00 award was tantamount to a $6,6o6.00 award for 
the 60 per cent which were converted. 
We are not here confronted with a situation where the 
trial court accepted ''cost'' as ''value,'' because the court 
under this evidence refused to do so. It did have before 
it the testimony of Rosenlof that at the completion of the 
job "all" the forms should not be appraised at more than 
$4,000.00, and under the subcontract we had the right to 
use the forms, to the end of the job. (R. 10) The trial 
court elected to believe this evidence, and refused to 
accept Nelson's testimony concerning cost as the measure 
of the value of forms. This is perfectly reasonable. Most 
of them were bought in 1955-1957. (Tr. 44) They do de-
preciate with age and use. (Tr. 72) The court had no 
evidence as to their condition. On an average, the forms 
had been used 300 or 400 times. If the forms had not been 
available for an appraisal, cost might have been given 
more weight - but the forms were in Provo where the 
case was tried. (R. 38) The court did have the testimony 
of Rosenlof to the effect that the forms should not be 
appraised at more than $4,000.00, (Tr. 138) and it so 
found. 
This brings us to the contention that plaintiff should 
have had a new trial. The granting or the denying of a 
motion for a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and it should not be disturbed in the absence 
of a clear abuse of that discretion. This court has so held 
on many occasions. (See, for example, Uptown Appliance 
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v. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P. 2d 826.) The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion here. 
On October 5th the appellant served interrogatories 
for the first time to ascertain the location of the forms 
and whether or not they had been used on other jobs. 
(R. 35) These interrogatories were promptly answered, 
and by October 20th, appellant knew where the forms were 
and that 60 per cent of them had been used twice on the 
State Mental job, but plaintiff made no effort to have 
them appraised or to look at them himself. 
The case was tried commencing November 5th, and 
both sides submitted detailed written memoranda. (R. 
42, 70) The respondents argued to the court that the 
appellant's evidence using ''cost'' as ''value'' was not 
proper and all the arguments made here were made in 
the court below. The Haycraft case discussing the use of 
the cost as evidence of value was referred to. (R. 61-2) 
Notwithstanding this, the later memorandum filed by 
appellant only asserted that he was entitled to the ''full 
value of the property converted,'' and he urged the court 
to award him $20,071.00 on his testimony as to what the 
forms would cost now if they were new. (Tr. 24, R. 72) 
The trial court on December 8, 1959, rendered a memo-
randum decision. (R. 75) in which it accepted Rosenlof's 
testimony of $4,000.00 as to the value of the forms. On 
December 22nd appellant filed a ''Motion for Reconsid-
eration," and stated as one of the grounds that the 
court "had failed to give weight or had overlooked the 
evidence of value in respect to the forms converted by the 
defendant. No affidavits were tendered, no request was 
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made for an opportunity to reopen to introduce further 
evidence. Plaintiff simply indicated that he desired to 
further argue the use of his cost figures as a measure of 
damages. The parties appeared before the court again 
and further argued the matter, and still no affidavits were 
filed and no effort was made to reopen to offer further 
testimony. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a further 
memorandum decision on February 10, 1960, (R. 89) and 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were signed on 
March 10, 1960. Only then did the plaintiff seek to reopen. 
Even then it was not alleged either in the affidavits or 
in the motion that there was any accident or surprise 
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, 
nor that he had newly discovered evidence which appel-
lant could not have discovered with reasonable diligence 
and produced at the trial, as contemplated by Rule 59(a). 
The appellant simply elected his theory and tried 
his case. Had he ''sold'' his theory, he could have 
"clipped" respondents for $20,000.00, but he failed. He 
reargued his theories on a motion for reconsideration 
and again failed. Now he wants to retry the case and 
adopt a different theory and now produce evidence which 
was readily available to him at the trial, but which he had 
elected not to use. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD \V. CLYDE 
Attorney for Respondents 
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